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Why do some civil wars terminate soon, with victory of one party over the
other? What determines if the winner is the incumbent or the rebel group?
Why do other con￿ icts last longer? We propose a simple model in which
the power of each armed group depends on the number of combatants it
is able to recruit. This is in turn a function of the relative ￿ distance￿be-
tween group leaderships and potential recruits. We emphasize the moral
hazard problem of recruitment: ￿ghting is costly and risky so combatants
have the incentive to defect from their task. They can also desert alto-
gether and join the enemy. This incentive is stronger the farther away the
￿ghter is from the principal, since monitoring becomes increasingly costly.
Bigger armies have more power but less monitoring capacity to prevent
defection and desertion. This general framework allows a variety of inter-
pretations of what type of proximity matters for building strong cohesive
armies ranging from ethnic distance to geographic dispersion. Di⁄erent
assumptions about the distribution of potential ￿ghters along the relevant
dimension of con￿ ict lead to di⁄erent equilibria. We characterize these,
discuss the implied outcome in terms of who wins the war, and illustrate
with historical and contemporaneous case studies.
￿We thank Hend Alhinnawi and participants at the 2007 LACEA Meeting and the WZB
Conference on Causes and Consequences of Con￿ict. We are especially indebted with Johannes
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11 Introduction
In the early 1980s the Shining Path launched an insurrection in Peru with the
support of thousands of peasants. After an initial retreat, the army￿ s counter-
attack in 1984 was led by the deadly Rondas Campesinas militias. Widespread
fear created by the Rondas Campesinas led to massive desertions of insurgents
from the Shining Path. This pattern soon became self-enforcing and the rebel
group eventually lost the war to the government. Civil war in Peru lasted less
than two decades and within that window it witnessed the sudden change from
the rebels￿relative success to their de￿nite defeat.
Almost two decades before the onset of the Peruvian war, a low scale con￿ ict
was already maturating in Colombia with the formation of two rebel groups:
FARC and ELN. Like its Andean neighbor, the Colombian government also
promoted the formation of paramilitaries in the 1980s to contend the rapid
expansion of the guerrillas. However, neither side ever generated sizable levels
of desertion nor were them able to secure enough manpower to dominate the
enemy by force. Civil war in Colombia persists to date after over four decades.
The average duration of civil wars has increased steadily since the end of the
second World War, reaching 16 years in 1999 (Fearon, 2004). This trend suggests
an increasing di¢ culty in ending intra-state con￿ icts. On the other hand, Toft
(2006) argues that two thirds of the circa 120 civil wars that ended between 1940
and 2000 did son by military victory of either party. Why do some insurrections
terminate soon while others are so much longer? What determines who wins
the war? Why do some wars pendulate between the dominance of one group
and the sudden recovery and take-over of the other? In this paper we think of
these questions through a simple model of how the technology of recruitment
of combatants determines the outcome of (an existing) war. Our model does
not provide an account of what triggers the onset of con￿ ict￿ whether ethnic
cleavages, social grievances, economic opportunity, etc. (see Fearon and Laitin,
2003 and Collier and Hoe› er, 2004 for empirical analyses of the causes of civil
war). Rather, we take con￿ ict between two parties as given and analyze how the
distribution of potential combatants along the most salient con￿ ict dimension,
whatever it be, together with the monitoring technology available to the groups￿
leaderships, shape the speed of con￿ ict resolution as well as the likelihood that
a speci￿c party results victorious.
The analysis of the determinants of civil war duration has been predomi-
nantly empirical. Regan (2002) studied the e⁄ect of foreign intervention on civil
war termination. Collier et al. (2004) and Fearon (2004) studied the impact of
socioeconomic and political factors on the hazard of peace by looking at di⁄er-
ent type of Survival models, using respectively monthly and yearly data on civil
war duration at the cross-country level. Montalvo and Reynal Querol (2007)
also make use Survival models, but focus their analysis on the impact of ethnic
polarization on the duration of war. Our paper lays out a simple theory that
relates the duration of war to the recruitment process and in this sense it does
not directly give theoretical grounds to previous empirical literature. However,
2in line with Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, one result of our model is that po-
larization does make con￿ ict less likely to be resolved in the short run. In this
respect, our paper ￿ts in the broader research agenda of Esteban and Ray, who
have proved that when the population is divided into clusters with respect to
some observable characteristic, and present substantial within-group homogene-
ity but between-group heterogeneity, the resulting polarization is closely linked
to the generation of social tensions and violent unrest (Esteban and Ray, 1994
and Duclos, Esteban and Ray, 2004).
We build on the rent seeking literature as our model features a contest over
an exogenous asset by two groups. The power of each group depends on the
number of combatants the group is able to hire vis-a-vis the size of the enemy￿ s
army. By focusing on the recruitment problem, we introduce a moral hazard
element to the baseline contest. When violence is at play, compliance is costly
and combatants have incentives to shirk. They can also desert altogether and
join the rival group. Performance cannot be enforced in court so the resulting
relational contract has to be self-enforcing (MacLeod and Malcomsom, 1989).
In our model this occurs through two constraints: a no-shirking constraint and
a no-desertion constraint. When met simultaneously, these constraints make
the compensation o⁄ered to each combatant incentive compatible.
Each group starts recruiting at its closest proximity and as the army expands,
further recruitment takes place farther away. Monitoring then becomes costlier
and non-compliance incentives get stronger. Hence, bigger groups have more
power but less monitoring capacity to prevent defection and desertion. This
general framework opens the ￿ oor for a variety of interpretations of what type
of proximity matters for building strong and cohesive groups, ranging from
ethnic distance to geographic dispersion.
While we focus on moral hazard, previous work on recruitment in civil war
has also emphasized the problem of adverse selection. Weinstein (2005, 2006)
identi￿es a rebel "resource curse" by which the abundance of resources facilitates
recruitment on the basis of short-term rewards, attracting opportunistic soldiers
who lack commitment and are not strongly identi￿ed with the cause of the
rebellion. The absence of such resources, however, provides the incentives for
a much solid recruitment practice, based on ideological commitment and the
promise of some kind of reward if longer-term objectives are achieved.
The moral hazard problem of recruitment is not a novel idea. It ￿rst ap-
peared in Polo (1995) who studied how internal cohesion shapes the e⁄ectiveness
of organized crime enterprises. Gates (2002) draws from Polo￿ s analysis, but fo-
cuses on recruitment in rebellion. In turn, we extend Gates￿analysis by looking
at the implications of the distribution of potential ￿ghters along the relevant
dimension of con￿ ict. Indeed, di⁄erent assumptions about the distribution of
agents lead to substantially di⁄erent set of equilibria. We characterize the uni-
verse of these, discuss the implied outcome in terms of who wins the war and
how soon this happens, and illustrate the di⁄erent cases with historical and
contemporaneous case studies.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we present the set up of the
3model and the set of constraints for recruitment to be incentive compatible. Sec-
tion 3 characterizes the equilibria that result from di⁄erent assumptions about
the distribution of agents along the relevant con￿ ict dimension, and discusses
examples that illustrate our argument. Section 4 concludes and discusses several
potential extensions of the model.
2 The Model
2.1 Set Up
Consider an in￿nite horizon polity in which two groups: the government G; and
a rebel group R; ￿ght every period over the control of an indivisible prize of
value K; which could be interpreted as the rents from holding political power.1
The two groups prepare for war by recruiting ￿ghters from the pool of available
potential recruits. For that purpose, each group i; i 2 fG;Rg; o⁄ers a compen-
sation wi; a decision that takes place simultaneously.2 The expected utility for
group i at any given period is:
Ui = Si(ni;nj)K ￿ niwi (1)
where Si; the probability of defeating the rival, is a concave function of both
group￿ s military capability, represented in turn by the number of combatants
ni and nj, where @Si
@ni > 0 and @Si
@nj < 0: In addition, we assume Si 2 (0;1) for
all values of ni and nj: That is, neither group can be fully eliminated, even if
a group runs out of combatants its leadership survives (for instance because it
can e⁄ectively hide) so there is always some opposition.
Clearly, group i will recruit combatants as long as the marginal cost, wi;
does not exceed the marginal bene￿t, @Si
@niK: However, both the government
and the rebels have to provide a compensations such that their ￿ghters remain
loyal. Non-compliance can take a variety of forms including refrainment from
carrying-out the assigned task; secretly providing information to the enemy, or
completely switching sides. Among these potential forms of noncompliance, we
consider the ￿rst and the third possibilities, abstracting from the existence of
spies.
Compliance is risky since combatants of group i run into the risk of being
killed by the enemy, which happens with probability (1 ￿ ￿i): That is, ￿i is
1The indivisibility of the prize makes it more likely that war occurs even under complete
information (Fearon, 1995). In this paper, however, we don￿ t model the decision on whether
to engage in an armed dispute or not. Rather, we take such dispute as given an explore the
conditions under which there can be a winner and the determinants of who the winner is.
2Armed groups in many civil wars often forcibly recruit in addition from￿ or as opposed
to￿ providing material compensations. In this model one can think of w as some sort of
subsistence level reward, which does not have to be monetary (but can have some monetary
component). Indeed, w may pick up any food, shelter and uniform received by the combatant.
The existence of w does not prevent recruitment to be enforced by force. In fact, as it will
become clear, in this model non-compliance is punished with death.
4the probability for a ￿ghter from group i of surviving a clash. We assume that
the probability that a soldier from group i gets killed in combat increases with
the size of the enemy￿ s army and is inversely related to the size of her own
group￿ s army. This implies @￿i
@nj < 0 and @￿i
@ni > 0: Further, we assume that
￿i(ni;nj) 2 (0;1) for all values of ni and nj. That is, there is always a positive
probability of surviving.
Of course, the risk of being killed in combat does not exist if the task is not
carried out. However, if left unpunished, non-compliance episodes may trigger
waves of defection so we assume that combatants who get caught shirking are
executed. Non-compliers are caught with probability (1￿pi): That is, pi is the
probability of getting away shirking.
Desertion in civil war is widespread and involves not only individuals but
also larger groups. Among other reasons, forced recruitment may explain the
lack of serious commitment to one￿ s principal. A large share of the irregular
armies across civil wars is composed by conscript soldiers (e.g. child soldiers).
This is so even in cases in which there are additional elements to expect greater
cohesiveness like the case of ethnic wars. For example, rebel ￿turncoats￿have
been used extensively by incumbent forces in di⁄erent con￿ icts (Kalyvas, 2006).
In our model, shirkers who survive capital punishment can either stay with their
current group or defect altogether and join the lines of the enemy.
Given a set of compensations W = fwG;wRg as well a set of probabilities
P = f￿G;￿G;pG;pRg; ￿ghters have the choice of whether or not to shirk, s; and
if they decide to do so, whether or not to desert, d: The actions of ￿ghters can
be described formally as: s : W ￿ P ! f0;1g and d : W ￿ Pjs = 1 ! f0;1g:
2.2 Incentive Compatibility
Let ￿ 2 (0;1) be the rate at which the future is discounted. The instantaneous
utility of a ￿ghter of group i who never shirks can be represented by the value
function:
V i(s = 0;d = 0) = V i(0;0) = ￿i
￿
wi + ￿V i(0;0)
￿
where it is assumed that the value of being killed by the enemy, which happens
with probability (1￿￿i), is 0: This equation means that a complier who survives
receives today￿ s compensation plus the discounted continuation value: Note that,
for ￿xed W and P, the future choice will always be equal to the present one so





The value of perpetual compliance to group i is then increasing in the com-
pensation o⁄ered by the group, in the probability of surviving in combat and in
the rate at which the future is discounted.
5Shirkers who are not caught as such can stick to their original army or switch
sides. The instantaneous utility of a shirker who stays is:
V i(1;0) = wi + ￿[piV i(1;0)]
A shirker does not run today into the risk of being killed in combat so
she fully enjoys the compensation wi. But tomorrow he can get caught with
probability (1￿pi) and killed, the value of which is 0: If she escapes punishment





The value of shirking is also increasing in the compensation and in the dis-
count factor, but decreasing in the probability of being caught no complying.
Shirkers who also desert can be hired by the enemy or not.3 Let q = f0;1g
be an indicator for whether hiring occurs (q = 1) and u be the outside option.
We assume that if the deserter gets hired she then becomes a complier to her
new group.4 Hence:




qV j6=i(0;0) + (1 ￿ q)u
￿￿
A deserter is also a shirker so there is no present risk of dying in combat.
If she avoids punishment from her original group she may or may not join the
enemy. If she does so becomes a complier forever after. Using (2) this implies:





+ (1 ￿ q)u
￿
(4)
Because desertion implies shirking, its value is increasing in the wage of the
left-behind group. It is also increasing in that of the receiving group, in the
probability of escaping punishment, in the probability of surviving a combat
against the former comrades and in the discount rate.
Recall that hiring a combatant requires that the marginal cost does not
exceed the marginal bene￿t. In addition, to guarantee that ￿ghters will stay in
and comply, the compensation o⁄ered to ￿ghters needs to be such that the value
of complying must be at least as large as the best alternative option, either to
shirk or to both shirk and desert:
V i(0;0) ￿ maxfV i(1;0);V i(1;1)g
3Deserters are highly valuable both as informants and to weaken the enemy by promoting
further desertions. This is the case, for instance, of Colombian right wing militias who have
absorbed many former guerrilla ￿ghters (Gutierrez, 2004).
4Intuitively this captures the idea that deserters who are accepted in new groups are
monitored more than other combatants to reduce the likelihood of enlisting spies. That is,
(1 ￿ ￿i) is larger for received deserters and we assume that it is large enough as to rule out
the incentive to desert back to the original army.
6Thus, a person will be hired by group i if wi ￿ @Si
@niK and the no-shirking and
no-desertion constraints are met. In short, wi has to be such that the following












+ (1 ￿ q)u
￿￿
(5)
The incentive compatible compensation o⁄ered to ￿ghters by group i is in-
creasing in the probability of getting away shirking, pi; in the probability of
surviving combat against the former comrades if the ￿ghter joins the enemy
group, ￿j; and in the wage paid by the opponent, wj: It is decreasing in the
probability of surviving combat given compliance to the current group, ￿i.
Our basic set up draws on the principal-agent framework for recruitment
laid out by Polo (1995) and followed by Gates (2002). However, in what follows
we illustrate how small variations in the recruitment opportunities have radical
implications for the outcome of the game. We illustrate the di⁄erent potential
equilibria with historical and contemporaneous case studies of civil war.
2.3 Recruitment Process and Equilibrium Wage
Consider a continuum of mass 1 of potential combatants distributed over the
unit space [0;1] according to some distribution f(x), which can take any form
(Figure 1 illustrates four potential shapes of f(x)). Let zi be the location
of group￿ s i leadership in the unit space and xf the positioning of potential
￿ghter f: Let jxf ￿ zij be the distance between group i￿ s leadership and ￿ghter
f (Figure 2): Assume that p
f
i ;the probability that ￿ghter f escapes punishment





@jxf￿zij > 0. The further away a ￿ghter is, the more di¢ cult
it is to monitor her so it gets easier to shirk and get away with it.
There is widespread evidence that geography shapes political allegiance in
civil war. Drawing from her ￿eldwork in Nicaragua, Horton (1998) argues that
peasants from peripheral regions with scarce military and political presence of
the Sandinista state tended to align with the Contras, for their geographical
proximity and hence in￿ uence. In contrast, in towns with e⁄ective state rule,
no anti-Sandinista voice was heard. Seidman (2002) refers as ￿geographical
loyalty￿the tendency during the Spanish Civil War to side with the camp that
controled the area where one lived; and Tone (1994) shows that during the
Napoleonic occupation, geographical proximity to the French in the Spanish
region of Navarra was inversely proportional to participation in anti-French
insurgencies. Insurgents were predominantly recruited in frontier towns which
the French could not e⁄ectively occupy.
5Note that if the compensation w were exogenous, this set-up would be that of a classical
rent-seeking model. Here, however, we endogenize w in the sense that it has to be incentive
compatible to ensure compliance.
7However, note that in this model ￿ distance￿is not necessarily a geographical
measure. The concept can be interpreted broadly, including for instance ethnic
or ideological distance
The strategy space of the group leaderships is very simple. Given the set of
probabilities P = f￿G;￿G;pG;pRg as well as the location in the unit space of
potential ￿ghter f, and the implied monitoring capacity over her, given by the
distance jxf ￿ zij, each principal decides whether to o⁄er the incentive compat-
ible compensation to f or else refrain from hiring her.
Proposition 1 The wage o⁄ered by group i to ￿ghter f in equilibrium ulti-
mately depends on the number of i￿ s own ￿ghters relative to the number of
￿ghters of the enemy, as well as on the distance between f and i￿ s leadership:
wi = wi(ni;nj;jxf ￿ zij)
Indeed, this set of variables determines all the endogenous parameters of the
incentive compatibility constraint: the probabilities of survival in combat (￿i
and ￿j) and the probability of getting away shirking (pi). The equilibrium wage
o⁄ered by group i is: increasing in nj because the probability of getting killed in
combat increases with the size of the enemy￿ s army; and increasing in jxf ￿ zij
because the probability of getting away shirking increases with distance. It is not
unambiguous, however, what the e⁄ect of an increase in ni on the equilibrium
wage would be. On the one hand the probability of surviving combat increases
with the size of one￿ s own army, so the required compensation can decrease;
on the other, additional combatants must be hired farther away from zi which
increases the monitoring cost so the opportunity cost of shirking has to increase.
Let￿ s assume for simplicity that R and G are positioned at the extremes
of the unit space, respectively at zR = 0 and zG = 1: Consequently, subject
to the incentive compatibility constraint (5), the rebel leadership would like
to hire ￿ghters from xf = 0 onwards (i.e. to the right of the distribution) so
as to maximize the detection of shirkers. If it hires all available combatants
from 0 up to xf = xR; the number of combatants hired by the rebel group will
be nR =
R xR
0 f(x)dx. Likewise, the government prefers hiring combatants from
type xf = 1 onwards (to the left of the distribution). The size of the government
army is ultimately: nG =
R 1
xG f(x)dx (Figure 3).
Let ni be the ￿ ￿ghting deterrent￿number of combatants of group i: Facing
such an army, group j ￿nds it not pro￿table to recruit any more combatants,
and group i wins the war. That is ni is such that:
@Sj
@nj
K < wj(nj;ni = ni;jxf ￿ zjj)
8Critically, we assume that deterrence is only possible if group i hires more
than half the total number of potential ￿ghters: ni > 1
2
R 1
0 f(x)dx = 1
2: That is,
if the leadership of i can hire beyond the median of the distribution.
Let xf be the position in the unit space of the last combatant hired to achieve
deterrence. Given the above assumption and the distribution of agents along
the unit space f(x):
Proposition 2 i) For a symmetric distribution, jxf ￿ zij > 1
2
ii) For an asymmetric distribution, jxf ￿ zij can be ￿ 1
2
3 Distribution Shape and the Outcome of War
3.1 Symmetric Distribution and Unique Outcome
We ￿rst consider a case in which the population of potential combatants is
distributed symmetrically along the unit space and investigate the conditions
for a unique outcome, namely there is no clear winner in the short run: both
groups hire combatants but none ￿nds it optimum to recruit combatants up to
the deterrent point, so complete dominance is not possible. Thus, at ni :
@Si
@ni
K < wi(ni = ni;nj;jxf ￿ zij) for i 2 fR:Gg
This case can arise, for instance, when there is a rough geography or low
ethnic cohesiveness, characteristics that curb the ability to monitor the perfor-
mance of ￿ghters.
There are two potential reasons why such outcome can prevail:
Case 1 Neither group leadership can e⁄ectively monitor more than half of the
total number of ￿ghters.
Case 2 Even if monitoring is possible, it may not worth hiring a ￿ghter.
The distinction between these two cases is subtle but in practice it has
very relevant policy implications. Exogenous ￿nancial support to i￿ s leadership
(e.g. resources sent by a nationalistic diaspora or a foreign power) such that it
can o⁄er higher compensations and hence hire more combatants will not work
under Case 1 since, given the scarce monitoring capacity, the new ￿ghters (who
are farther away from zi) will have an incentive to shirk. However, Case 2
gives greater hope to external assistance. More resources will allow the group￿ s
leadership to employ more ￿ghters and ultimately to take over the opponent.
In sum, the ￿nance from third parties can be a decisive factor in ending con￿ ict
only in some cases.
Consider Case 1.
9When monitoring technology is insu¢ cient to hire ￿ghters beyond the me-
dian, both groups have to be satis￿ed only with agents closer to them. That is,
for group i: jxf ￿ zij ￿ 1
2 for i 2 fR;Gg and all f:
Which under symmetric distribution implies,
jxf ￿ zij ￿
1
2
< jxf ￿ zij; (6)
were the right hand side inequality follows from the ￿rst part of Proposition 2.
Combatants beyond the median of the distribution cannot pro￿tably be
employed. This implies that deserters from one group cannot be monitored by
the enemy, and hence q = 0: Thus (4) reduces to
V i(1;1) = wi + ￿piu









Here, desertion is avoided altogether (i.e., V i(1;1) is not binding) whenever
wi
1 ￿ ￿pi
> wi + ￿piu
Note that this is equivalent to assuming that the payo⁄ from shirking is
higher than the outside option, V i(1;0) > u:
We make this assumption for simplicity and thus rule out desertion as an
equilibrium outcome. Note that all we need for this to hold is that the outside
option be su¢ ciently small (close to zero, to which we normalize the value of
death).6 This is generally the case in civil wars where non-combatants are
military objectives of every group that does not acknowledge them as their
supporters, which constraints civilians to join either one army or the other (see
Kalyvas, 2006 and Vargas, 2008).
This assumption implies that the incentive compatible compensation has to
o⁄set only the value of a non-deserting shirker, or V i(0;0) ￿ V i(1;0):





However, this does not guarantee that all ￿ghters lying between the group￿ s
core and the median will be hired. A ￿ghter f located at xf such that (7) is
not met, is not employable.
6This assumption is very likely to hold in civil wars in which armed groups take advantage
of negative income shocks to recruit from the a⁄ected population. For instance this appears
to be the case of the main co⁄ee areas in Colombia during the late 1990s￿co⁄ee crisis, when
the commodity lost 70% of its value in international markets (Dube and Vargas, 2008).
10Let ni and xf be respectively the number of recruits and the position of the
last recruit such that:












: Note that beyond xf, group
i cannot recruit further since it is not incentive compatible as de￿ned by (7).
Hence, compared to (6), a stronger condition for a unique outcome under a
symmetric distribution, when monitoring is costly is:
jxf ￿ zij ￿
1
2
< jxf ￿ zij
In short, defection and desertion are not possible if the distribution of ￿ghters
along the unit space is symmetric and there is no recruitment beyond xf:
Consider now Case 2.
The monitoring technology may well be such that the leadership of group
i can hire ￿ghters beyond the median such that 1
2 < jxf ￿ zij for i 2 fR;Gg:
However, even in this case, group i may not want to hire up to xf if the marginal
payo⁄ of hiring is lower than the marginal cost, or:
@Si
@ni
K < wi(ni = ni;nj;jxf ￿ zij)
Proposition 3 When potential ￿ghters are distributed symmetrically along the
relevant con￿ict dimension such that 1
2 < jxf ￿ zij;
i) If monitoring beyond the median is not feasible, a su¢ cient condition for
the unique outcome of the absence of a clear winner in the short run is:
jxf ￿ zij ￿
1
2
< jxf ￿ zij
ii) A necessary condition is that the marginal payo⁄ of hiring the deterrent
number of ￿ghters does not o⁄set the marginal cost (which can happen even if
monitoring beyond the median is feasible):
@Si
@ni
K < wi(ni = ni;nj;jxf ￿ zij)
The unique outcome is more likely to occur when distributions have thicker
tails. That is, this situation arises when the population is divided into sharp
clusters, where geographic distance (or ethnic homogeneity, or political ideology,
etc.) is small within clusters but large between them. When tails are thick, it is
costlier to attain the minimum force necessary to overcome the rival, ni; since
principals have to recruit further away from their epicenter, while the marginal
net bene￿t remains the same: @Si
@niK ￿ wi (Figure 4).
11The Colombian civil war illustrates the di¢ culty of ending a con￿ ict when
neither group can outperform the enemy.
The con￿ ict started in the early 1960s with the formation of largely rural
peasant-based guerrillas in peripheral areas where the government had been tra-
ditionally absent. Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, the con￿ ict e⁄ectively
served as a cold war proxy, with the Soviet block supporting the guerillas and the
US supporting counter-insurgency e⁄orts. From the late 1970s and during all
the eighties military-backed paramilitaries became de facto counterinsurgency
units, some of which are still active today.
Fighting in Colombia occurs mainly in rural areas where the rebels dispute
the control of strategic strongholds with the state forces and the paramilitary.
The polarization of the rural population in terms of compliance to one group or
the other (often secured by coercion) has perpetuated the con￿ ict and to date
no group has secured nation-wide the numbers to shift the balance in their favor
and trigger a rede￿nition of the balance of forces and ultimately the termination
of war (either after some period of asymmetric ￿ghting or by forcing a political
negotiation).
3.2 Symmetric Distribution and Multiple Equilibria
The unique outcome of unresolved con￿ ict is not the only situation that can
take place when the distribution of potential combatants is symmetric. We now
look at the multiple equilibria case when desertion takes place to an extent that
one group secures enough manpower to defeat its adversary. Whether R or G
is the winner is decided by expectations.
Recall that wi = wi(ni;nj;jxf ￿ zij) can be increasing or decreasing in ni: It
will be decreasing if the probability of being killed by the enemy in combat falls
steeply enough such that it o⁄sets the decrease in monitoring capacity. It will
be increasing if the opposite happens, inducing group i to o⁄er a compensation
that increases the opportunity cost of shirking and deserting. If the latter e⁄ect
dominates there will be no desertion and we are back to the unique outcome
scenario of unresolved con￿ ict. But when a bigger army translates into lower
wages, given the symmetry of the game, multiple equilibria can take place. This
happens because there are increasing returns from recruitment.
In this situation, if potential (as well as actual) ￿ghters believe group i will
win the war they will align with i even if this implies deserting from group j:
Unlike the previous case where both groups fail to recruit enough manpower to
defeat the enemy, here in principle both armed groups should be able to recruit
beyond the median of the distribution because they have the monitoring ability
to do so. Whether R or G will end up enlisting the deterrent number of ￿ghters
and winning the war is contingent on expectations. Formally,
Lemma A necessary condition for multiple equilibria to exist is:
jxf ￿ zij ￿
￿ ￿xf ￿ zi
￿ ￿
12To see this notice that if the contrary were true such that jxf ￿ zij > ￿ ￿xf ￿ zi
￿ ￿; group i would only be able to hire at best ni < ni: But, by de￿-
nition ni is the minimum army size necessary to decimate the opponent. So
with an army of ni group i can never win.
On top of monitoring feasibility, ￿ghters have to be pro￿tably hired at ni;
which implies: @Si
@niK ￿ wi(ni = ni;nj;jxf ￿ zij):
Proposition 4 When potential ￿ghters are distributed symmetrically along the
relevant con￿ict dimension such that 1





will be a multiplicity of equilibria if and only if:
@Si
@ni
K ￿ wi(ni = ni;nj;jxf ￿ zij)
For a given monitoring technology, this condition is more likely to be met for
distributions which have more density around the median (Figure 5). With such
a distribution, the recruitment cost of hiring up to the deterrent level becomes
lower while the marginal net bene￿t remains the same: @Si
@niK ￿ wi: This logic
is similar to that of models of democratic politics with swing voters. In these
models, undecided voters who can ultimately support one party or the other,
may turn out to be decisive for the political outcome. Similarly, in this model
combatants can desert their army and join the former enemy to create a decisive
imbalance of power, allowing one group to secure n ￿ghters and hence win the
war. Russell (1974) illustrates this point eloquently:
"(...) [N]o mass rebellion can succeed without defection of some
of the regime￿ s armed forces. (...) [R]evolutionaries (...) must devote
a great deal of thought to how to encourage defections from the
police and the army." (Quoted in Gates, 2002).
In contrast, the multiple equilibria outcome is less likely for more polarized
distributions as illustrated in the previous subsection.
Even if this game is in￿nitely repeated, the results are ￿ static￿in the sense
that wages are stationary (since they do not depend on the history of the game)
and the distribution of the potential ￿ghters is ￿xed. However, recruitment
into armed groups is a dynamic phenomenon and from this perspective a more
realistic model would be one that introduces a truly dynamic component. For
instance, an unstable environment can be created by allowing the two principals
to interact. We leave this extension for future work. However, this discussion
implies that the above conditions are only necessary conditions for multiple equi-
libria. A truly dynamic model would be able to illustrate when the population
can at all go back and forth between the two equilibria.
The analysis in this subsection characterizes a fundamentally unstable state
of a⁄airs. Dominance by one party can be reversed quickly. To enable such
massive swing, the majority of the society must constitute a sizeable population
13who are not ￿ close￿to neither of the warring extremes, or is somewhat in the
middle. Even though the existence of such cases of multiple equilibria are not
uncommon, the very lack of irreversibility makes them less prone to make it
into the highlights of history. Nevertheless, we discuss some examples where,
arguably, the outcome of revolutions was in￿ uenced by expectations-driven mas-
sive desertions.
Tilly (1973) describes how in Sicily in the 19th century, after the closing
of University in 1848, student protests led to small gatherings. This initiated
further demonstrations that ended up with a few deaths. Soon, a full rebellion
spread out and most of the island came to be under the control of the students.
The end of the rule of the incumbent government was established when the
liberal bourgeois and aristocrat joined the movement.
The triumph was, however, short-lived as the revolutionary coalition failed
to maintain its cohesiveness to run the state. By 1849, the bourgeois and aris-
tocrats abandoned the revolutionary cause helping the old government return.
The outcome of the Sicilian Revolution was easily reversed: the liberal bourgeois
and aristocrats were the critical mass of ￿ swingers￿whose support determined
the fate of the revolution.
In the early 1980s the Shining Path launched an insurrection in Peru with the
support of thousands of peasants. After an initial retreat, the army￿ s counter-
attack in 1984 was led by the deadly Rondas Campesinas militias. Widespread
fear created by the Rondas Campesinas led to massive desertions of insurgents
from the Shining Path as well as informants and collaborators from the peas-
antry. This pattern soon became self-enforcing and the rebel group eventually
lost the war to the government. Civil war in Peru lasted less than two decades
and within that window it witnessed the sudden change from the rebels￿relative
success to their de￿nite defeat.
Something similar happened during the Zapatista Revolution in early 20th
century Mexico. Wolf (1973) describes the appearance in 1910 of a coalition of
diverse groups of Mexicans who collectively rebelled against Por￿rio Diaz. At
the time, Diaz￿ s rule was increasingly despotic and the opposition was furiously
quieten. It was the combination of the speed of the outbreak and the diversity
of groups represented by the coalition of rebels that made the revolution a
successful one.
The Revolution started at Morelos and was carried out by both the peas-
antry and disa⁄ected intellectuals with urban ties. A second hub of rebellion
soon appeared in the north. There, the inequality of land holdings, the presence
of cowboys and bandits and the abundance of cheap labor, fed into an overall
discontent that soon made of the region one of the hottest spots of the Revo-
lution. However, these clusters had limited regional in￿ uence and that was not
enough to overturn Diaz￿ s rule. A third force ￿nally broke the deadlock: twenty
six thousand men deserted from the constitutional army and joined the rebels,
leading them to a ￿nal victory.
143.3 Asymmetric Distribution
Consider the case in which potential ￿ghters are distributed asymmetrically






















0 f(x)dx; the Rebel leadership (located at zR = 0) would have smaller pool of
potential ￿ghters to hire from. Hence, even if the Government cannot recruit





2, it may be able to
reach enough manpower within its circle of (incentive-compatible) in￿ uence to
defeat the Rebel group. This will happen when:
Z 1
xG






However, this is only a su¢ cient condition. It is necessary that the Govern-
ment ￿nds it pro￿table to hire nG : @SG
@nGK ￿ wG(nG = nG;nR;jxf ￿ zGj); and
the Rebel ￿nds it not pro￿table to hire nR : @SR
@nRK < wR(nR = nR;nG;jxf ￿ zRj):
So the only equilibrium under this case is when the government wins. Thus,
when the majority of potential ￿ghters is closer to the Government (and recall
that this is not necessarily a geographical statement) a successful rebellion is
unlikely.







same logic used above would lead us to claim the Rebel group as the winner
(Figure 6). Hence,
Proposition 5 When the pool of potential ￿ghters is distributed asymmetrically
so that jxf ￿ zij can be ￿ 1
2; group i will win if:
@Si
@ni




K < wj(nj = nj;ni;jxf ￿ zjj)
This suggests that if the Government is ￿ close￿to the majority the popula-
tion, any attempt of revolution can easily be thwarted. While if it maintains a
distance, revolution will become more imminent.
Why some societies are prone to rebellions while others seem to be immune
has been studied by Moore (1966):
15"A highly segmented society that depends on di⁄use sanctions
for its coherence and for extracting surplus from the underlying peas-
antry is nearly immune to peasant rebellion. On the other hand, an
agrarian bureaucracy or a society that depends on central authority
for extracting the surplus, is a type most vulnerable to such violent
outbursts.￿
This quotation suggests that strong centralized governments generate dis-
tance from the peasantry, thereby enabling the rebels to recruit from the pe-
riphery. In contrast, maintaining close ties with the villagers makes it more
di¢ cult to create a viable opposition.
This contrast is evident when we compare the history of China and Japan
in the wake of the 20th century. While in China there was a centralized author-
ity, Japan had an established feudal system. Even though imperial Japan had
strong central administration and the advent of commerce withered the power
of traditional landowners, the country was designed to serve the interest of the
imperial rule. There, in sharp contrast to the case of China, villagers maintained
a close link with the landowners: A Japanese village was also a community in
symbiosis with the prevailing authority. In this sense, the ￿ distance￿between the
peasants and potential rebels was larger than the distance between the peas-
ants and the landlords. Indeed, despite numerous sporadic rebellions during the
Tokugawa period, an epoch making revolution failed to exist.
Imperial China, on the other hand, got rid of the landed aristocracy and
former landlords eventually turned into scholarly administrators steeped into
the Confucian ideal. This widened the ￿ distance￿between the central adminis-
tration and the peasants. A Chinese village was only a collection of independent
homes who did not have much strong ties with the land, making migration more
likely. This too the rebels to recruit and mobilize combatants to strategic places
determining the outcome of the Chinese revolution.
4 Discussion
Contrary to Marx￿ s prediction, revolutions seem to have taken place mostly in
peasant societies, not in industrial settings. Many have sought to explain this
apparent contradiction. According to Calhoun (1988), peasant societies retain
the social capital that overcomes free rider problems and hence facilitate rebel
movements. In contrast, urban workers in industrial clusters lack such ties and
such movements become less likely. In contrast, Moore (1966) emphasizes the
absence of the monopoly of violence inherent to primarily agrarian societies. To
Wolf (1973), in turn, revolutions get momentum when capitalism has attenuated
the power of rural landlords, weakening traditional elites.
This paper brings forth a potentially complementary explanation. Here,
what matters for a successful revolution is the relative support of the (exoge-
nously distributed) population. This is so regardless on whether the con￿ ict is
16driven by ethnic, religious, ideological, class, or political grounds. Relating our
model to the discussion above, because industrial labor is primarily urban, it
is close to both capitalists and the government. This proximity to the ￿ incum-
bent￿leaves little room for a rebel leadership to form a critical mass of recruits
without avoiding the wrath of the establishment. On the other hand, if the
rebels can recruit successfully and monitor a large army, a successful rebellion
is more likely and hence the transformation of society. As exempli￿ed by the
cases of Northern Mexico and Southern China, geographical distance plays a
crucial role. These places became hot-spots for recruitment precisely because
they are distant from the center. If the peasantry however remains in close
association with the landed elite, as in Japan during Togukawa period, rebellion
becomes an unlikely event.
In addition, when both the government and the rebel leadership can garner
moderate support from di⁄erent segments of the society, the con￿ ict is less
likely to be resolved in the short run. This is the case of the long-lasting, low
intensity Colombian Civil War. Yet in some other cases, massive expectation-
driven shifts in loyalty from one principal to the other may be decisive for victory.
Indeed, not all successful revolutions were carried-out entirely by the frontier
residing peasantry. In the Mexican case, the ￿nal victory was achieved by a
civilian-military coalition. Algeria followed a similar suite. Even though the
anti-colonial movement started from village-level recruitment of rebels, it was
the external support of the armies of Tunis and Morocco that gave the decisive
push to the revolution (Wolf, 1973). Such cases illustrate how a defecting group
or an external power can strengthen the rebel movement. We do not treat the
case of external support explicitly in our model.
Finally we would like to discuss some potential extensions to our model.
Indeed, recruitment in civil war is to date largely understudied (with the excep-
tions of Gates, 2002 and Weinstein, 2006) and this paper can be considered part
of a greater research agenda on the microfoundations of civil con￿ ict. In section
3.2 we mention the possibility of a more dynamic model that would allow for
explicit interactions between the two principals. Several other avenues for future
research can be pointed out. First, in the present model the distance between
principals and agents is exogenously given. It would be interesting to illustrate,
in the case of a potential class-con￿ ict, how the distribution of land and the
presence of inequality can endogenize the distance to the principals. This will
also explain the opportunity cost of joining the rebellion for each individual
in terms of her land holdings. Relatedly, the position of the government and
that of the rebel leader are exogenously ￿xed in this model, and the distance
between the two groups is normalized to one. An interesting expansion would
have the position of the principals be a decision variable. Second, in this model
the population can only ￿ght. However, the outside option, u; could be explic-
itly modelled, for instance by introducing a production economy and hence the
opportunity for the citizens to decide whether to join one armed group or work
productively (as in Grossman 1991). Third, in the current model the principals
do not have a budget constraint. Resources are implicitly assumed to be unlim-
ited and the only constraints are the no-shirking and no-desertions conditions.
17A budget constraint can be introduced, for instance, by having each principal
control some natural resource which provides an exogenous endowment. We
abstract from this in order to emphasize the underlying moral hazard problem
of recruitment. Indeed, introducing natural resources to the model can poten-
tially bring interesting insights, especially if one allows for these to be predated
by the other party. However, this would turn the focus of the paper from the
substantive problem of moral hazard in recruitment of soldiers to that of the
existence or not of some sort of "resource-curse". Likewise, the model abstracts
from potential incentive compatibility problems of the principals. The promise
to pay the incentive compatible wage, for instance, is assumed to be credible
but in reality such promise may depend on, for example, whether the principal
is winning or loosing the war.
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